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of entrepreneurial income, incentives for wealth accumulation, wage-setting institutions and labor 
market regulations. Using original data, we provide evidence of a low prevalence of nascent 
entrepreneurs and a small net employment contribution by high-growth firms. We admit that 
indisputable evidence for the effects of institutional arrangements is almost impossible to 
establish. However, the consistency of our theoretical arguments and empirical data makes a 
strong case for the notion that the Swedish case illustrates the costs of giving too little weight to 
economic renewal in policy making.  
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There are strong reasons to believe that productive entrepreneurship is an essential 
explanatory factor of the economic performance of a country, and hence that cross-country 
differences in the degree of productive entrepreneurial activity are likely candidates for 
explaining part of observed cross-country differences in economic performance.1 As a 
concrete manifestation of a vibrant entrepreneurial culture, one would expect to observe (i) a 
high rate of firm formation and a high prevalence of nascent entrepreneurs, and (ii) that the 
most viable commercial ideas are translated into a sizable number of high-growth firms. 
 
A large body of empirical research aims at identifying micro-level factors explaining the 
emergence and growth of firms. As regards emergence, long lists of psychological and socio-
demographic characteristics of business founders have been compiled and examined by Gasse 
(1996), Miner (1996) and Stanworth et al. (1990). Concerning growth, Storey (1994), in an 
extensive survey of this literature, identified 35 such factors. Delmar (1997) and Wiklund 
(1998) provide more recent literature reviews. These studies focus on differences in 
performance across firms while taking the broader institutional framework (“the rules of the 
game”) as well as the aggregate outcome as given.  
 
By contrast, in this study we focus on the links between social institutions and firm start-ups 
and growth, and between such micro-level dynamics and aggregate economic development. 
The express purpose of the study is to attempt to identify the most important institutional 
determinants of firm emergence and growth, using various types of data from Sweden.  
 
There has been little room for the entrepreneurial element in theoretical mainstream 
economics (Baumol, 1993; Kirchhoff, 1994; Kirzner, 1997). The main reason for this 
disregard of the entrepreneur in mainstream economic theory is that he or she largely eludes 
analytical tractability. However, if one subscribes to the view that the main rationale for 
economic research is to enhance our understanding of the workings of the real world, this is, 
to put it mildly, a tenuous excuse. 
 
It is easy to point out several institutional studies that broadly deal with the grand issue of 
why some countries, such as the UK of the late 18th century, had the requisite institutional set-
                                                 
1 It is important to emphasize that the societal reward structure may be such that entrepreneurial effort is 
channeled towards inherently unproductive activities such as rent-seeking and redistribution of property rights 
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up to allow a long-term growth process to start. Or analogously, why other technologically 
advanced countries, such as China under the Ming Dynasty, did not embark on a similar 
growth path. Three of the most influential studies in this tradition are North and Thomas 
(1973), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) and Mokyr (1990). The most important proposition in 
these studies is that a necessary condition for a long-term take-off is that property rights are 
well defined ex ante. Baumol (1990) specifically deals with the effect of institutions/the social 
payoff structure on the supply of productive entrepreneurship across highly varying historical 
contexts. However, to our knowledge, there are few, if any, studies before Davis and 
Henrekson (1997, 1999) that analyze how various institutional set-ups in a contemporary 
context affect firms of different size, industry, age et cetera. In this paper their analysis will 
be extended to the effects on entrepreneurial behavior and firm growth. 
 
It is a formidable task to construct convincing tests of the hypothesis that the institutional set 
up is an important determinant of firm growth and entrepreneurial activity. Ideally our 
approach would be able to explain why the quantitative effect of a certain individual or firm 
specific factor may vary across institutional set-ups. To provide a fully satisfactory answer, 
the analysis would first have to identify the relevant institutions and their likely effects on 
behavior. The institutional arrangements we analyze include missing arenas for 
entrepreneurship in the care sectors and for household-related services, taxation of 
entrepreneurial income, incentives for wealth accumulation, wage-setting institutions and 
labor market regulations. Second, we need high quality data. The micro-level data sets we 
utilize have been carefully checked and prepared for our type of purpose. We are thus 
confident that limitations to data quality will not be a source of distorted results. Lastly, we 
need a yardstick for comparison and a means to rule out competing explanations.  
 
An analysis of the influence of institutional arrangements is almost by definition restricted to 
situations with few observations and many possible influences. In this regard the validity of 
our conclusions will in part have to be judged in terms of the strength of the theoretical 
arguments in combination with the correspondence between theoretical predictions and 
empirical results. A test of the hypothesis is greatly improved if there is institutional variation. 
This can be achieved in two ways: (i) by studying differences in behavior across countries 
with differing institutions (see Davis and Henrekson, 1999, 2000) and (ii) by studying a 
                                                                                                                                                        
rather than to wealth-creating activities (Baumol, 1990; Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1991). The term 
entrepreneurship in the remainder of this paper is used exclusively to mean productive entrepreneurship. 
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country over time during periods when institutions change. We will mostly use the latter 
approach in this paper. As regards comparisons we have comparable (common methodology) 
international data for start-up activity. For business growth we will have to rely on relevant 
within-country comparisons. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 a brief characterization of Sweden’s long-term 
growth and employment performance is given. In the two following sections we carefully 
assess whether the performance observed at the macro level is consistent with studies at the 
individual and firm level. In particular, we investigate the extent of independent business 
start-ups and the role of high growth firms for job creation. The remainder of the paper is 
devoted to an analysis of the pertinent institutions and rules of the game that may explain the 
empirical findings in sections 1–3. In section 4 it is argued that the production of services 
generically is highly amenable to entrepreneurial activity. However, entrepreneurs have been 
barred from large areas of service production, since they have been de facto monopolized by 
the public sector, or as in the case of household-related services, commercial exploitation is 
stymied by the very high rate of labor taxation. In sections 5 to 8 we analyze four key 
institutional areas likely to be crucial for entrepreneurship and firm growth in general. The 
areas discussed are taxation of entrepreneurial income, incentives for wealth accumulation 
and the development of a well-functioning venture capital market, job security mandates, and 
wage-setting institutions. In section 9 we discuss at some length the recent signs of an upturn 
in entrepreneurial activity in Sweden, and whether this development is consistent with our 
thesis. Section 10 concludes the paper. 
 
 
1. Swedish Aggregate Economic Performance 
 
In Table I we present the growth rate of GDP and GDP per capita in Sweden, OECD and 
OECD Europe in the 1970–98 period. Sweden’s slow growth in a long term-term perspective 
is evident: the growth of GDP and GDP per capita has been roughly 1.0 and 0.5 percentage 
points, respectively, below the OECD and OECD Europe averages since 1970.  
 
The slow economic growth rate in Sweden since 1970 has had a highly significant impact on 
the Swedish income level compared to that of other countries. In purchasing-power-parity 
adjusted comparison Sweden had the fourth highest GDP per capita in the OECD area in 
1970, with per capita GDP 5 percent above the average of the 23 rich OECD countries 
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(excluding Mexico, Turkey and the most recent members Poland, South Korea, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic). By 1990 Sweden had fallen to a tied 9th position 6 percent below this 
average. In 1998 Sweden was ranked 15th with a GDP per capita 14 percent below the 
average of the 23 rich OECD countries.2. 
 
Table I The Growth Rate of GDP and GDP per Capita in Sweden, OECD and OECD 
Europe, 1970–98 (%). 
 
 GDP GDP per capita 
Sweden 1.7 1.3 
OECD 2.7 1.9 
OECD Europe 2.4 1.8 
 
Source: OECD, National Accounts Main Aggregates 1960–1997 Vol. 1, 1999 and OECD, Main Economic 
Indicators, February 2000. 
 
Even if the rate of economic growth has been slow relative to the OECD average since the 
mid to late 1960s, the employment rate was for a long time exceptionally high. In 1990 the 
employment rate (defined as employment as a share of population aged 15–64) was, together 
with Switzerland, the highest in the OECD. However, during the early 1990s employment fell 
dramatically in Sweden and in 1998 it was down by 11.1 percentage points to 70.2 percent, 
which put it in the 9th position among the OECD countries (OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 
65, June 1999).  
 
The employment performance of the US, on the other hand, was totally different. 
Employment adjusted for population growth rose by approximately 27 percent in the US 
between 1970 and 1998, while it decreased by 8 percent in Sweden during the same period.3  
 
Moreover, the OECD figures are not adjusted for differences in the number of hours worked. 
Nickell (1997) adjusts for hours worked by defining total potential employment as the product 
of maximum annual hours worked and the total working-age population. We may assume that 
the maximum annual hours worked is 2,000 (40 hours per week times 50 weeks). Such a 
comparison is made in Table II. In 1998, the average annual hours worked was 1,957 in the 
US and 1,551 in Sweden, while the employment rates where 74,3 and 70.2 percent,4 
                                                 
2 Source: OECD, National Accounts Main Aggregates 1960–1997 Vol. 1, 1999 and OECD, Main Economic 
Indicators, February 2000. 
3 OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1998; OECD, National Accounts 1960–1997, 1999 
4 OECD Economic Outlook, Vol. 65, June 1999. 
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respectively. As a result, the Swedish work-hours adjusted employment rate was 54.5 percent 
compared to 72.7 percent in the US.5 From the table it is also clear that the work-hours 
adjusted employment rate has decreased somewhat between 1973 and 1998 in Sweden while 
increasing sharply in the US. A low level of employment is also typical of most other 
European countries. 
 
Table II The Level of Employment in Selected OECD Countries, 1973 and 1998. 
 
Country Year Average annual 
hours of work 
per employed
Employment rate 
(%) 
Work-hours ad-
justed employ-
ment rate (%)
Sweden 1973 1,557 73.6 57.3
 1998 1,551 70.2 54.5
US 1973 1,924 63.4 61.0
 1998 1,957 74.3 72.7
Japan 1973 2,201 71.0 78.1
 1995# 1,889 74.0 69.9
European 1973 1,844 67.6 62.0
average† 1998 1,631 65.0 52.7
Note: Employment rate is defined as total employment divided by total population aged 15–64. Work-hours 
adjusted employment rate is defined as employment rate x  (average annual hours of work per employed 
person/2 000). #Latest available year. †The unweighted average of all European countries for which the requisite 
data are available: Sweden, Finland, France, Norway, Spain, the UK and Germany. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1995, July 1996 and July 1999 and OECD, Economic Outlook, June 
1999. 
 
A key feature of Swedish policy has been expanding public sector employment. Figure 1 
shows that the entire growth in employment after 1950 took place in the public sector. 
Between 1950 and the early 1990s, 1.1 million jobs were added in the public sector, while 
private sector employment stagnated. This dramatic employment shift resulted in a very high 
proportion of total employment in the public sector in Sweden – higher than any other OECD 
country. From this perspective, private sector employment performance looks very weak.  
 
 
Figure 1 Cumulative Change of Private Employment, Government Employment 
 and Population in Sweden, 1950–98 (thousands). 
 
Enclosed 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden and Gunnarsson and Lindh (1997). 
 
                                                 
5 Nickell compares employment in 20 OECD countries using this approach. It turns out that the variations 
between countries are very large. If we proceed from a maximum of 2,000 hours worked annually, employment 
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This section has documented that the rate of growth in Sweden has been slow relative to 
almost all other OECD countries during the last three decades. As a result, Swedish per capita 
income dropped sharply relative to a broad average of other rich countries. Regarding 
employment there has been a great difference between the rapid rate of job creation in the US 
compared to Sweden (and Europe), where employment has been stagnant since the 1970s. 
This has resulted in an hours-adjusted employment level in the US on the order of 35 per cent 
higher than in Sweden and other European countries. 
 
Is this unfavorable development at the macro level consistent with analyses at the firm and 
individual level? This is the subject to which we now turn. 
 
 
2. The Prevalence of Business Start-ups 
 
In 1985 Statistics Sweden started to record the number of “genuinely new firms” each year. 
Apart from a downturn  during the deep recession in 1991–93 there has been an upward trend 
in these statistics and annual start-up rates after 1994 have been well above 50 percent higher 
than they were in the mid 1980s (Statistics Sweden, 1999). In a seven-country comparison by 
Reynolds, Storey and Westhead (1994), Sweden was reported to have the highest start-up 
rate. Rather than proving high entrepreneurial activity in Sweden, these results indicate that 
business entry statistics are notoriously difficult to compare – the Swedish data were simply 
more complete.  This lack of comparability is admitted in a somewhat more recent 
compilation of business entry statistics (ENSR, 1996, table 3.2). To deal with the problem, a 
special effort was made in that report to adjust data to make them comparable. This adjusted 
comparison indicated that Sweden’s entry rate was not clearly different from those of Finland, 
Italy or Japan, but clearly lower than the start-up rate for each of 15 other European countries 
(mostly EU) as well as the US. This definitely suggests that business start-up rates in Sweden 
are low in an international comparison. However, despite the appearance of precision 
conveyed by the confidence bands accompanying the analysis cited, the corrections made to 
achieve comparability can still be questioned. Another drawback is that start-up rates are 
related only to the size of the business population, which is a more questionable basis for 
comparison than is the size of the human (working age) population (Garofoli, 1994). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
varies from 43–44 percent (Spain and Belgium) to 72–73 percent (Japan and the US). 
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More directly comparable estimates of business start-up activity across countries can be 
derived from two major, on-going collaborative research efforts, viz. the Panel Study of 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics6 (PSED; see Reynolds, 1997a, 2000) and the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM; see Reynolds, Hay and Camp, 1999). The PSED was 
originally an American effort that has spun off similar studies in other countries. Its main 
goals are (i) to arrive at national estimates of the prevalence of “nascent entrepreneurs”, i.e., 
people who are in the process of starting a new business at a given point in time, and (ii) to 
follow a representative sample of nascent entrepreneurs/start-up efforts over time and study 
how the process evolves. The GEM is an international collaborative effort whose primary 
goal is to investigate the relationship between entrepreneurial activities  and economic 
growth. 
 
In both of these international research efforts central goal is to determine what proportion of 
the population are nascent entrepreneurs at a given point in time. Operationally, this 
information is obtained by asking the following question in phone interviews of a random 
sample of adults: “Are you, alone or with others, now trying to start a new business?” The 
percentage answering this question in the affirmative is used in the international comparisons 
in Table III. 
 
We use the Swedish main study (1998) as the focal study and consider only differences 
relative to the results of that study. For that study a stratified random sample of 49,979 
individuals was drawn. It was possible to obtain a telephone number for 35,971 (71.9%) of 
the individuals. The remaining 28.1% were not listed (n = 13,338), had severe disabilities (n = 
381) or had moved abroad (n = 289). Of those contacted by telephone, 30,427 individuals 
(84.6 %) agreed to participate. Out of these, 715 answered that they were involved in an 
independent business start-up. The age group 25–44 was over-sampled in order to get a higher 
yield of nascent entrepreneurs. The results have been weighed to represent adequately the age 
ranges used in Table III. 
 
                                                 
6 This study was previously referred to as the ‘ERC’ (Entrepreneurial Research Consortium). One of the authors 
(Davidsson) is a member of the Executive Committee of the American PSED and also involved in the Swedish 
study, and hence has access to the data sets for these two countries. 
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Essentially the same methodology was used in all the other studies, so the results should be 
comparable.7 The main tendency of the results is very clear. In only one comparison (with 
Japan) does Sweden come out significantly higher. In all other comparisons Sweden is either 
significantly lower (10 contrasts) or there is no statistically significant difference (9 contrasts). 
In particular in comparison with countries outside Europe (except for Japan) Swedish 
prevalence rates appear low. Hence, to some extent low rates of business start-ups appear to 
be a European rather than a specific Swedish problem. However, also in some European 
comparisons (with the Netherlands, Norway and the UK) the Swedish figures are low.  
 
                                                 
7 Some sources of error need to be mentioned. The sample sizes vary substantially across samples. Statistically 
significant differences are much more easily obtained when results from studies based on large samples are 
compared. While all studies aim at obtaining samples representative of the population, differences in the 
approach (random digit dialling vs. sample of specified individuals), prevalence of listed phone numbers and 
propensity to participate may influence the results. Minor differences in the wording of the focal question apply 
to Norway and part of the German sample. In the studies within the GEM research a somewhat more restrictive 
definition of nascent entrepreneur was used. Apart from affirming the focal question (cf. above) the respondent 
also had to a) expect to own all or part of the business, b) currently be active in the start-up effort, and c) deny 
that the effort is an “infant business” (i.e., already “up and running”, albeit at an early stage). In addition, there 
was no upper age limit in the GEM samples. The last two differences lead to conservative comparisons relative 
to the hypothesis that Sweden would have a low rate in 1998. The direction of the effect of the other possible 
sources of error mentioned above is unknown. It should also be kept in mind that due to differences in successful 
realization of the efforts and in the prevalence of team vs. solo start-ups (and team size), differences in 
prevalence of nascent entrepreneurs do not necessarily translate directly into similar differences in firm start-up 
rates. 
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Table III  Estimates of the Prevalence of Nascent Entrepreneurs in Different Countries. 
 
Country Year Sample size Nascent 
entrepreneurs % of 
pop. aged 18+ 
Nascent 
entrepreneurs % of 
pop. aged 18–64 
Sweden a 1998 30,427 2.0 c   2.2 d  
Sweden a 1997 976 2.4 c    
Canada b 1999 appr. 1,000 5.3 e *   
Denmark b 1999 appr. 1,000 1.5 e    
Finland b 1999 appr. 1,000 1.3 e    
France b 1999 appr. 1,000 1.7 e    
Germany b 1999 appr. 1,000 2.1 e    
Germany a 1999 appr. 2,000   2.9 d    
Israel b 1999 appr. 1,000 3.5 e *   
Italy b 1999 appr. 1,000 3.0 e    
Japan b 1999 appr. 1,000 1.1 e ¤   
Netherlands a 1998 appr. 30,000   3.5 d * 
Norway a 1996 9,469 3.1 c *  2.6 d   
Norway 1997 appr. 10,000   3.8 d * 
UK a 1998 appr. 2,000   3.1 d * 
UK b 1999 appr. 1,000 2.4 e    
US a 1993 1,016 3.9 c *   
US a 1996 454 3.8 c *   
US a 1998 appr. 30,000   8.4 d * 
US b 1999 appr. 1,000 5.6 e *   
* = significantly higher (p < 0.05) than Sweden in 1998. ¤ = significantly lower (p < 0.05) than Sweden in 1998.  
a = part or forerunner of the international PSED research. b = part of the international GEM research. c = age 
range restricted to 18–70 years. Previously reported in Delmar and Davidsson (2000) who apart from own data 
built on Kolvereid and Alsos (1997), Magnussen (1997) and Reynolds (1997a, 1997b).  
d  = previously reported in EIM (2000). e = previously reported in Reynolds, Hay and Camp (1999). 
 
Data concerning attempted harmonization of actual start-up rates as well as prevalence of 
nascent entrepreneurs correspond reasonably well. For the ten countries included in both 
compilations the Spearman rank order correlation is 0.45 (based on the 18+ column in Table 
III and on ENSR, 1996, figure 3.1). In both sets of data, the US has a much higher rate than 
Sweden, and Japan is one of the few countries with a point estimate lower than Sweden. 
Based on this it feels safe, despite the limitations of the data, to conclude that business start-
up rates in Sweden are low rather than high. The ENSR data on actual start-ups are based on 
the 1988–94 period. We know that the rate of start-up of genuinely new firms has increased 
since then (Statistics Sweden, 1999). However, the nascent entrepreneur research suggests 
they remain unimpressive by international comparison. 
 
A suggestive result, emphasized by Reynolds, Hay and Camp (1999), is that the female to 
male start-up ratio is much higher in the countries that have the highest prevalence of nascent 
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entrepreneurs. This is based on the GEM data where no direct comparison with Sweden can 
be made. However, the compilation of PSED data (EIM, 2000) suggest that for all 
comparisons where Sweden comes out significantly lower in the rightmost column in Table 
III, Sweden has a worse (lower) female to male ratio than the other country. Hence, relative 
female under-representation is part of the explanation for Sweden’s low overall rates. As 
regards age distribution the results reported by Delmar and Davidsson (2000) suggest that in 
comparison with the US, Swedish prevalence of nascent entrepreneurs is particularly low in 
the 25–34 age bracket. A comparison with the GEM results aggregated across countries is not 
conclusive but suggests that the Swedish prevalence rate is particularly low for the youngest 
(18–24) age group and closest to the average for other countries in the oldest (55+) age group. 
Unfortunately, data on the sectoral distribution of the start-up efforts are as yet not available. 
 
 
3. Job Creation by High-Growth Firms 
 
For high-growth firms (HGFs) we have no directly comparable international data.8 Towards 
the end of this section we will comment upon our results in the light of studies carried out in 
other countries, but as our primary yardstick we will have to rely on a national comparison in 
trying to assess the contribution of HGFs. Specifically, we will discuss the following: 
 
1. Comparison with total job creation in the economy. 
2. Comparison with the job contributions from genuinely new firms during their first year in 
operation. 
3. Comparison with total unemployment in the Swedish economy. 
 
Our data were collected from Statistics Sweden. We worked closely with their register 
experts9 in combining data from three different registers: the Central Firm and Establishment 
Register (Centrala Företags och Arbetsställeregistret [CFAR]), The Register of Company 
Groups (Koncernregistret), and the Register of Foreign-owned companies (Registret över 
utlandsägda företag). Ten annual versions of each register were combined in order to create a 
data set that deals specifically with the HGFs.  
 
                                                 
8 It would, of course, have been advantageous to have a basis for direct cross-national comparison. In fact, the 
research presented in this section was originally the Swedish part of an international collaborative effort 
orchestrated by the OECD. However, because of unsurmountable data availability problems and lack of funding 
the intended international harmonization never materialized. 
9 In particular, Peter Thorén at CFAR has made a major contribution to making possible the analyses presented 
in this paper. 
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Three relevant units of analysis are conceivable. The first is the establishment (plant). This 
unit is preferable from a technical point of view because establishment codes are relatively 
stable. However, establishments in multi-establishment firms often do not correspond to the 
theoretical concept of a “firm” (cf. Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000). This leaves us with either 
of the two remaining units: the (legal) company or the entire company group (i.e., a hierarchy 
of parent and daughter companies under the same ownership control). As companies may 
change their legal form and structure – and have their identification codes changed – analyses 
on these levels run the risk of yielding biased results. This problem is all the more serious as 
HGFs are probably more likely to undergo changes in their legal-structural make-up than are 
stable firms. 
 
We have handled this problem by not accepting the company code as the relevant criterion for 
following a unit over time. Instead we used establishment identity codes, which are more 
stable. If essentially the same group of establishments appears in the registers under different 
company codes in different years, they are treated in our data set as one and the same 
surviving firm.  
 
Moreover, a HGF is likely, eventually, to grow beyond the original unit by adding new units 
(subsidiaries, a holding company). Thus, the company becomes a company group, and if only 
the original company’s size development is considered a large part of the company’s (now: 
the company group) growth is left out of the analysis. Therefore, we conducted a separate 
analysis on the company group level. In the firm level analysis both independent and 
company group affiliated companies are included. Each company in a company group is 
included as a separate case as long as it fulfills the other pertinent criteria. In the company 
group level analysis the entire company groups are the cases, while independent companies 
without company group structure are excluded from the analysis. An ideal study would follow 
units first as individual enterprises and then, when applicable, as company groups. Our data 
set provides some (but not entirely satisfactory) opportunity to conduct such analyses. We 
will supplement our analysis with some tracking over time of this kind. 
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The data include all commercially active companies or company groups within the non-
government sector in Sweden as long as they had at least 20 employees in November 1996.10. 
There are 11,515 such enterprises (both independent and affiliated with company groups) and 
4,377 company groups.11 Annual data for each enterprise and company group have been 
compiled for the 1987–96 period. 8,173 enterprises and 1,758 company groups were active 
during the entire period, while the remainder were started later during the period. 
 
We use the number of employees as our size (and growth) indicator, because we have 
complete sales data only for about 50 percent of the firms (and a biased 50 percent). We focus 
on absolute rather than relative growth. We therefore choose a definition that maximizes the 
importance of HGFs for job creation. We thus define the HGFs as the ten percent of the firms 
in the data set that exhibit the highest average annual increase in absolute employment. 
Likewise, high growth company groups are defined as the ten percent of the company groups 
that exhibit the highest average annual increase in absolute employment.  
 
While we define HGFs on the basis of total employment growth, we also analyze what 
proportion of total growth is organic and what proportion is attributable to acquisition. This is a 
crucial distinction. Arguably, organic growth is relatively more likely to reflect entrepreneurial 
activity, i.e., the emergence and expansion of new economic activity. Growth through acquisition 
represents the moving of existing activity from one organization to another, and therefore the 
expansion does not constitute job creation on the societal level. Through the previously described 
link to the establishment level, we know for each year whether an establishment is (i) old to the 
economy and to the firm, (ii) old to the economy but new to the firm, or (iii) new to the economy 
                                                 
10 Empirically based answers to research questions are always in part contingent on the researcher’s 
methodological choices. Even if it can be hoped that methodological differences do not lead to diametrically 
opposite conclusions, it is important to understand the assumptions and conditions that the analysis rests upon. 
As we study HGFs, we are required to study firms that have actually grown and (arbitrarily) to define a time 
period within which this growth should have occurred (because HGFs are not a stable category; its “members” 
continually change). Our data are to be compared with a cross-section survey of 20+ employee firms conducted 
in November, 1996. Compared with such a study, ours has the distinctive advantages that (i) it is a census rather 
than a sample, and (ii) size data for each year were collected at the right time rather than retrospectively. Our 
study is not a panel that follows all firm existing in 1987 through their subsequent development. Hence, it is 
possible that during the 1987–96 period firms existed which had strong growth, but which by 1996 had ceased to 
exist or shrunk to less than 20 employees. It is likewise probable that some firms now identified as HGFs would 
not be defined as such had the study covered instead, e.g., the 1989–98 period. Every analysis of the HGFs is 
then necessarily time specific. Our conclusions are founded on the assumption that firms which leave the HGF 
category are substituted by other, similar firms so that the characteristics of the HGF group have some degree of 
stability, even though its members are changed.  
11 Actually 11,748 enterprises and 4,758 company groups. In the analysis enterprises and company groups which 
enter for the first time in 1996 are excluded; hence the difference. 
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and to the firm. The initial stock of jobs in units of type (ii) are treated as growth-through-
acquisition while all other size increases are regarded as organic growth.  
 
The leftmost column in Table IV reveals that between 1987 and 1996 the HGFs expanded by a 
total of 185,264 employees. Note that this includes independent companies as well as those 
affiliated with large, multinational company groups. Davidsson et al. (1996), employing a similar 
definition of new jobs, showed that annual gross job creation in the private sector in Sweden is 
on the order of 300,000. By comparison, the 185,000 new jobs over a ten-year period must be 
regarded as modest. In relation to total job creation (comparison 1) the contribution by HGFs 
appears to be unimpressive. 
 
Table IV The Employment Contribution through Expansion of High-Growth Firms in 
Sweden, 1987–96. 
 
Growth by 
category 
Firms; 
HGFs 
Firms;
other
Firms; 
total
Company 
groups; 
HGFs
Company 
groups; 
other 
Company 
groups; 
total
Total employment 
growth, 1987–96 
185,264 –251,633 –66,369 157,766 –324,762 –166,996
Organic 
employment 
growth, 1987–96 
59,626 –325,322 –265,696 –31,216 –662,813 –694,029
Total employment 
growth, 1996  
45,294 11,537 56,831 27,249 –26,094 1,155
Organic 
employment 
growth, 1996  
20,949 6,342 27,291 –11 –48,617 –48,628
Average annual total employment growth per firm/group     
Mean 26.4 –2.8 0.1 76.4 –9.7 –1.1
Std. dev. 56.0 39.2 42.1 199.0 108.9 123.8
Median 13.2 0.7 1.0 27.0 1.0 1.5
Average annual organic employment growth per firm/group    
Mean 13.2 –3.6 –1.9 –0.1 –19.8 –17.8
Std. dev. 37.7 42.7 45.5 94.0 186.8 179.7
Median 11.0 0.5 0.8 13.0 0.1 0.4
 
According to Statistics Sweden (1998) genuinely new entrants created 49,000 new jobs in 
1996, 28,000 of which were full time jobs. This figure fluctuates from year to year but it is 
roughly of this magnitude, which also makes 185,000 in ten years appear low (comparison 2). 
Unemployment in Sweden in 1996 (comparison 3) was several hundred thousands regardless 
of what measure was taken, and consequently the hope that the gazelles (Birch & Medoff, 
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1994) would provide a quick fix for the problem appears unwarranted judging from these 
data. The table shows that the HGFs could not quite make up for the contraction of other 
firms. The reader should then keep in mind that additional losses of employment through 
closures are not included in this analysis.  
 
All our comparisons thus point in the same direction: the contribution to employment by the 
HGFs was modest. This can probably be validly translated into saying that the Swedish 
economy during this period suffered from a relative lack of HGFs. This interpretation is 
further supported by the fact that it only takes an annual growth of 13.2 employees for a firm 
to reach the median of the high-growth category. In order to barely qualify as a HGF an 
annual growth of 7.6 people suffices.  
 
Knowing that the period includes the very deep 1991–93 recession it may be argued that this 
conclusion is premature. In addition, there may have existed companies during the period, 
which have subsequently shrunk or closed down. Furthermore, new entrants appear over the 
years, which distorts the results. The final year – 1996 – is less problematic in these respects. 
This is a “good” year in terms of the business cycle (which is evident from the fact that non-
HGFs also increased employment). Table IV shows that the HGFs increased by 45,294 (40 
per firm on average) employees during 1996. This is a large number compared to the 185,000 
for the entire period, but it is still low if one expects this category alone to provide a quick 
solution to the unemployment problem. It would take many years like 1996 in a row to 
achieve that. The 45,000 is also a large number in relation to the total net increase of 56,831 
that the firms in the database exhibit. However, the roughly 40,000 new jobs provided by 
genuinely new firms during their first year in operation are excluded from the analysis, as are 
the modest expansion of a  large number of small and young firms that remain smaller than 20 
employees (Statistics Sweden, 1998). As already mentioned, gross annual job creation 
averaged approximately 300,000 during the period; this figure is likely to have been even 
higher during the favorable business cycle conditions prevailing in 1996.  
 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the importance of HGFs is reduced rather than increased 
when we turn instead to company groups. This is evident from the right hand side of Table IV. 
The ten percent high-growth company groups do (for obvious reasons) exhibit larger annual 
growth per entity. As the number of groups is substantially lower than the number of firms in 
the same size bracket, the aggregate job contribution is in fact lower when the analysis is 
15 
  
conducted on the company group level. This is true regardless of whether the entire period or 
only the final year is analyzed.  
 
Thus far the contribution of the “growth elite” has appeared to be modest. As we turn our 
attention to what part of total growth is organic this impression is further reinforced. On the 
company level less than one third of total employment growth is organic over the entire period. 
During 1996 the share is somewhat higher but still below 50 percent. During a boom year like 
1996 the HGFs in Sweden– large and small, young and old, independent and subsidiary, goods 
producing, service producing and trading firms – collectively created around 20,000 new jobs in 
organic terms. This is about half of the net job creation by genuinely new firms during their first 
year in operation (Statistics Sweden, 1998). Behind this finding is, among other things, the fact 
that some firms that appear to be HGFs in terms of total growth do not grow at all, or even 
shrink, in organic terms.12 The latter stands out very clearly when we turn to high-growth 
company groups. During the ten-year period high-growth company groups exhibit negative 
growth in organic terms! Even in 1996 there is no organic job creation by high-growth company 
groups.  
 
As indicated above it is likely that HGFs eventually form company groups and continue their 
growth in that form. It is therefore possible that our analyses hide a group of HGFs that have 
appeared as new significant actors during this period. We therefore conducted a supplementary 
analysis in order to capture the most spectacular growth cases, allowing also for transfer from 
firm to company group status.13 The result of this exercise was the following: 
                                                 
12 There are ways to define HGFs, that will make them look relatively more important. One natural alternative in 
our case is ”the ten percent of all firms which in 1996 increased employment the most in organic terms”. In this 
category employment increased by 43,122 people in 1996. That is, we are still finding figures of the same order 
of magnitude as the contribution by ”genuinely new firms” (Statistics Sweden, 1998).  
13 First, we chose all independent firms in 1987 (4,047 units) that had not lost their independent status by 1996. 
This was true for 2,863 companies, 2,340 of which were still single companies whereas the remaining 523 were 
now the top parents in a company group. Second, we analyzed companies that were top parents of a company 
group in 1987 and where the entire group had less than 250 employees (1,134 units) and thus in its entirety could 
be regarded as an SME (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises). We retained those that still had independent 
status in 1996. This turned out to be true for 695 units, 444 of which were still top parents whereas 251 had 
divested to become single companies. Among the 3,558 (2,863 + 695) “surviving independent” units identified 
in this way, we singled out those that had experienced extreme growth during the period. The amount of growth 
was obtained by subtracting 1987 size from 1996 size. For both years the company size measure was used if the 
unit in that year represented a single company, and the size of the entire group was used if the unit represented a 
company group. In this way the analysis also captures cases that start out as independent firms and eventually 
continue their growth by forming a group and adding new units to it. We defined entities that had grown by 250 
employees or more as extreme growth entities. On the company group level we cannot separate growth through 
acquisitions from organic growth, and the analysis thus concerns total employment growth over the entire ten-
year period. 
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• A total of 23 cases of extreme growth were detected, i.e., cases adding 250 new employees 
or more. 
• Nine of the 23, including the only three cases of 1000+ employment growth can be 
discarded as data errors – or at least not organic growth – which despite all precautions have 
slipped into our data. More specifically, six cases appear because of major reconstructions 
in the bank and insurance industries. Another three cases are producer co-operatives that 
probably have undergone some legal reconstruction; we know they are not spectacular 
growth businesses.  
• Among the remaining 14, we find one TV channel, one personnel leasing company and two 
parcel delivery services. This means that at least four of the 14 most spectacular growth 
cases are directly related to deregulation acts passed by the government. 
• Among cases that existed in 1987 either as independent companies or as SME company 
groups, and which still existed as independent entities in 1996, the most spectacular growth 
case added 596 new jobs. Only fourteen cases added more than 250 jobs each; collectively 
these fourteen cases added 5,217 new jobs over the ten-year period. This is close to a 
complete void of spectacular high growth firms. 
 
In summary: regardless of how we conduct the analysis (unit, period, type of growth) we are 
unable to find a small group of “elite” firms that collectively account for a substantial share of 
total job creation. This appears to be in sharp contrast with results reported for the US and the 
UK. Birch and Medoff (1994) and Birch, Haggerty and Parsons (1995) maintain that all new 
jobs net in the US are created in a fairly small number of rapidly growing firms. Kirchhoff 
(1994) finds for the US that the 10 percent fastest growing firms in the 1978 cohort of new 
firms contributed 74 percent of all new jobs created by this cohort during the eight subsequent 
years. Storey (1994, p. 113) reports that out of 100 small firms in the UK at a certain point in 
time, the four fastest-growing firms will generate half of the total number of jobs created by 
these 100 firms. It should be realized that studies that arrive at very impressive shares of job 
creation being attributable to a high growth elite do so in part because they relate that elite’s 
job contribution only to other members of the same cohort. Such studies thus disregard job 
contributions by firms that were already in existence when the cohort was created as well as 
jobs that are added by new entry in subsequent years. However, at least the US studies tend to 
show that the high growth elite creates impressive numbers of jobs also in absolute terms. As 
noted above, we fail to find such a category in Sweden during the period studied.  
 
Thus, we may conclude from the analyses in sections 2 and 3 that studies at the firm and 
individual level are consistent with the observed weak performance at the macro level. But 
can these findings be related to pertinent institutions and economic policies that can be 
expected to lead to this result? The remainder of our paper will deal with these issues. 
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4. Missing Arenas for Entrepreneurship 
 
One important prerequisite for the emergence of a great deal of entrepreneurship and the 
existence of a sizable number of high growth firms is that key industries and sectors of the 
economy are available for entrepreneurial exploitation. In this section we will discuss, under 
two headings, why a large part of service production is either closed to or severely restrained 
from entrepreneurial business development in Sweden. This implies that important arenas are 
closed or only partially open to productive entrepreneurship.  
 
 
4.1 The Household-Related Service Sector  
 
Cross-country comparisons of industry-level employment point to considerable scope for 
substitution of certain economic activities between the market and nonmarket sectors. For 
Sweden, studies indicate that more time is spent on production in the household than in the 
market. According to the 1997 Service Sector Taxation Report (SOU 1997:17), 7 billion 
hours were devoted to household work in 1993, while production of goods and public and 
private services accounted for only 5.9 billion hours. Furthermore, paid work not reported to 
the tax authorities was estimated to represent approximately 10 percent of the hours worked in 
the marketplace.  
 
In a well-functioning, decentralized market economy, there will always be entrepreneurs who 
recognize opportunities for starting new operations or expand existing ones, thereby creating 
jobs. Reliable data as to which types of businesses offer such prospects may be obtained by 
examining economies that successfully create new jobs. We will compare Swedish trends 
with those of the US, where employment has been growing steadily over the past few 
decades. 
 
Table V displays major service industries where relative employment is substantially greater 
in the US than in Sweden. The table clearly demonstrates that relative employment in the US 
is considerably greater in household-related services, such as repair of durable goods, hotel 
and restaurant, retail sales, laundry and household work.  
 
As indicated in the 1997 Service Sector Taxation Report, the private service sector is 
exceptionally small in Sweden, even compared to other OECD countries than the US. This is 
particularly the case for wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants and miscellaneous 
services. In the case of miscellaneous services, total employment is approximately half the 
average for the OECD countries (7 percent as opposed to 15 percent).  
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Table V A Comparison of Service Industries with Large Relative Employment 
 in the US Relative to Sweden in 1994. 
 
Industry Share of employment (%) 
 US Sweden 
Private household workers 0.8 0.02 
Repair services 1.1 0.2 
Restaurants & hotels 7.2 2.3 
Retail trade 11.3 7.5 
Laundries and cleaning  0.6 0.2 
Telecommunications 1.0 0.6 
Financial institutions 2.9 1.6 
Insurance 1.9 1.1 
Source: Henrekson (1998). 
 
As US trends in recent decades indicate, new jobs net arise primarily through the rapid growth 
of an increasingly differentiated service sector. The service sector, particularly activities 
highly substitutable for ordinary household work (cooking, laundry, cleaning, gardening, 
repair and maintenance, et cetera), often lends itself to a one-person business, a small 
business, a new enterprise or a family-owned business. 
 
High rates of taxation of labor tend to make it more profitable to shift a large share of the 
service production to the informal economy, in particular into the “do-it-yourself“ sector. In 
the case where the cost of the service consists of labor cost only one can show that – see 
Appendix – it is profitable to produce the service in the market when:  
 
rate tax marginal sbuyer'1
rate)security  social1)(rate VAT the1(
typroductivi yourself"-it-do"
typroductivi sSeller'
 taxbefore ehourly wag sSeller'
 taxbefore ehourly wag sBuyer'
−
++>
>⋅
 
 
Let us call the right-hand side of this expression “the tax factor”.14 The expression describes a 
fundamental economic relation, which, given wage and productivity differentials, is a crucial 
determinant of the demarcation line between taxed and untaxed work. Low rates of taxation 
on labor require smaller wage differentials before tax and/or productivity differences to avoid 
crowding out of professional work by unpaid work in cases where unpaid (or black market) 
work is feasible. 
 
                                                 
14 The marginal tax rate includes the employee’s mandatory contributions to social security. 
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The tax factor in Sweden is in the range 2.7–4.1 (1997 tax code). In the US the tax factor is 
generally in the 1.4–1.9 range (see Henrekson, 1998). Comparisons between Sweden and the 
US (California) show that in order for a professional service producer to be competitive vis-à-
vis unpaid household production, the professional must have a productivity edge of 170–310 
percent in Sweden, whereas 40–90 percent is sufficient in the US (in the case of an equal 
market wage). Alternatively, in the case of equal productivity (e.g., in child care) the hourly 
wage of the buyer must exceed that of the seller by a factor 2.7–4.1 in Sweden, whereas a 
factor 1.4–1.9 is sufficient in the US. 
 
As a result, the emergence of a large, efficient service sector competing successfully with 
unpaid work is less likely in Sweden than in the US and other countries with lower rates of 
labor taxation. As a corollary, an important arena for nascent entrepreneurs and HGFs 
becomes less accessible. 
 
 
4.2 Public Production of Goods and Services 
 
As a first approximation public production of private services such as health care and child 
care takes place in the local (including regional) government sector. In fact, all net 
employment growth between 1960 and 1998 took place in the local government sector 
(Statistics Sweden, National Accounts).  
 
These publicly produced private services are in many cases highly suitable for production in 
private firms, often small ones. The political decision to produce these services primarily 
through a public sector monopoly has largely barred this area to both start-up activity and the 
emergence of high-growth firms. Table VI summarizes the share of private production for the 
major services that are fully or primarily tax-financed. It is clear that the private production 
share is very low in activities like child care, care of the elderly and after-school care, despite 
the fact that these activities are highly amenable to private, small firm production. The 
potential market is huge. The operating costs incurred by local governments for schooling, 
child care and care of the elderly exceeded 10 percent of GDP per year in the mid 1990s, and 
the health care sector is almost as large.  
 
 
20 
  
Table VI Private Sector Production Share for Major Services That Are Primarily 
 Publicly Funded, 1996 (percent). 
 
Service Share 
Institutional child care (pre-school) 12.5 
Child care in the home (of the 
professional) 
2.2 
After-school care 4.5 
Compulsory schooling 2.4 
High school 1.9 
Care of the elderly at nursing homes 8.3 
Care of the elderly in special apartments 5.1 
Care of the elderly in their own home 2.6 
Hospital care 4.3 
Medical consultations 28 
Share of doctors privately employed 10 
Psychiatric wards 24 
Children’s dental care 5 
Source: Werenfels Röttorp (1998). 
 
 
Another area with great potential for new firm formation and entrepreneurship concerns 
public sector purchases of goods and services beside education, health and welfare services 
from the corporate sector. These purchases exceed 10 percent of GDP, and they could in 
principle be opened to fair and equal access by private firms. However, these markets are 
dominated by 1,500 municipally owned corporations with an aggregate turnover of roughly 
115 billion kronor per year (OECD, 1996). In particular, municipal corporations have a 
dominant position in the housing market: 56 per cent of all apartments in the rental market are 
owned by municipal companies and municipal corporations also have a dominant position in 
the electricity, gas, heating and water supply and the communications sector (Hallgren, 1997). 
According to Bergdahl (1995) only 11 percent of the total activities of local and regional 
governments could be tied to purchases from the private sector in the early 1990s, but even 
more important, only slightly more than one third of these purchases were made through 
competitive bidding.  
 
Hence, due to the de facto monopolization by the public sector or the unequal access for 
private businesses in the markets emanating from government purchases, vast areas of the 
Swedish economy have remained unexploited as sources of commercial growth. In particular 
in the health sector, it is easy to imagine how a different organizational mode could have 
provided a basis for the emergence of new high-growth firms.15 Local governments as 
producers are unlikely to grow beyond the local market, however efficient they are. In fact, in 
                                                 
15 See Henrekson and Rosenberg (2000) for an in depth analysis of these and related issues. 
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many cases this is not even allowed. Private firms, on the other hand, which start out as 
suppliers to one local government, can grow by penetrating other local markets and also 
export markets. 
 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that both the impediments to the household-related service 
sector and to penetration by private entrepreneurs of the education and care sectors, are likely 
to be of particular concern for female entrepreneurs. As already noted (section 2) relative 
entrepreneurship among females is low in Sweden and female firms are less likely to grow 
than male firms (Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2000). 
 
 
5. Taxation of Entrepreneurial Income 
 
Several features of the pre-1990 Swedish tax system disfavored younger, smaller and less 
capital-intensive firms and discouraged entrepreneurship and family ownership in favor of 
institutional forms of ownership. During an extended period of time, for three decades 
beginning in the early 1960s, there were extreme differences in taxation for different sources 
of finance and owner categories: (i) debt was the most favored and new share issues the most 
disfavored; (ii) households/individuals were taxed substantially more heavily than other 
owner categories. For example, an investment yielding a pre-tax real rate of return of 10 per 
cent financed by a debt instrument meant that the tax-exempt institution received a real rate of 
return of 18.3 per cent after tax. In contrast, for a household investing in a newly issued share 
with the same real rate of return the situation was very different: 10 per cent before tax 
became –3.7 per cent after tax. See Table A in the Appendix and the calculations in Södersten 
(1984, 1993) and Davis and Henrekson (1997). Naturally, tax rules benefiting debt financing 
relative to equity financing and institutional relative to individual ownership systematically 
favored large, real capital intensive, publicly traded and well-established firms.  
 
Studies such as King and Fullerton (1984) and Fukao and Hanazaki (1987) also show that 
Swedish tax policy was extreme in these respects. Furthermore, the Swedish tax system 
generally subsidized housing investment and has historically had very high marginal tax rates 
(above 90 per cent in the highest income bracket in the late 1970s) on individual income. 
 
The 1991 tax reform entailed a substantial “leveling of the playing field” for different types of 
owners and sources of finance, although the leveling was not complete. In 1994 the tax code 
was further reformed and the playing field became for all practical purposes leveled. 
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However, a 1995 act reinstated a higher tax burden on equity financing. Although the tax 
reform act of 1991 reduced the distortion between debt and equity financing, there remains a 
substantial differential today. Furthermore, the tax code still implies a much higher tax burden 
for investments financed with equity owned by households rather than by institutions.  
 
In order to analyze how the tax system affects entrepreneurial behavior it is not sufficient to 
focus on the taxation of individual owners of firms. To a large extent the return on 
entrepreneurial effort is taxed as wage income. First, a large part of the income accruing from 
closely held companies has to be paid out as wage income. Second, a great deal of the 
entrepreneurial function is carried out by employees without an ownership stake in the firm. 
 
We display the total marginal tax wedge for three categories of workers since the early 1950s 
in Figure 2. For industrial workers the marginal tax wedge doubled from 38 to 76 percent 
from 1952 to the late 1970s. For executives it rose from roughly 50 percent to more than 90 
percent during the same period. The marginal tax wedge for the average white-collar worker 
peaked at 85 percent. Minor tax reforms in the first half of the 1980s reduced tax wedges 
slightly. The 1990/91 tax reform resulted in a great fall in the marginal tax wedges for all 
groups. For all three categories the wedges decreased by roughly 10 percentage points. Since 
then marginal tax rates have increased again, and in 2000 they were typically five percentage 
points higher than in 1991. 
 
Figure 2 Total Marginal Tax Wedge for Industrial Workers, White-collar Workers 
 and Executives in Sweden, 1952–97 (percent). 
 
Enclosed 
 
Source: Du Rietz (1994) and new calculations supplied by Du Rietz. 
Note: The marginal tax wedges are evaluated at mean earnings each year. ”Executive” is defined as an individual 
in the management group (below the CEO) in a private firm. The tax rate includes mandatory social security 
contributions paid by the employer or the employee, the marginal income tax and indirect taxes on private 
consumption (all income is assumed to be spent for private consumption purposes). Property taxes are excluded. 
The tax wedges for executives and average white-collar workers coincide after 1990. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the use of stock options to encourage entrepreneurial behavior 
among employees is highly penalized by the tax system, since gains on options are taxed as 
wage income when the stock options are tied to employment in the firm. Thus they are 
subjected both to mandatory social security (33 percent) and the marginal tax rate. Since the 
marginal tax rate is close to 57 per cent this entails a total tax rate of roughly 68 per cent. The 
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firm that issues the stock options does not pay the social security tax until the stock options 
are exercised, and hence the firm cannot calculate the cost of its stock option plan. The only 
way to convert part of the gains on stock options to income on capital taxed at 30 percent is to 
tax the assessed value of the stock options at the time of receipt as wage income. The 
subsequent gains will be taxed as capital. However, this scheme has two negative side effects: 
(i) it cannot be used by wealth constrained employees, and (ii) the employees face a greater 
risk since taxes are paid even if the gains do not exceed the tax payments.16 
 
 
6. Incentives for Wealth Accumulation 
 
The availability of equity financing is critical for both start-ups and the expansion of existing 
firms (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Lindh and 
Ohlsson, 1996). In general, the riskier the business, the greater the reliance on equity relative 
to debt financing. The existence of collateral notwithstanding, a sizable infusion of equity is 
often a prerequisite for obtaining comprehensive credits. The reasons for this are 
straightforward: outside creditors have difficulties assessing the owner’s competence and the 
future viability of the firm (the problem of asymmetric information; Akerlof, 1970). The 
smaller and newer the firm, the more difficult for outside financiers to assess the viability and 
profitability of the proposed investment project. Moreover, Hutchinson (1995) argues that 
small firms have a lower efficient debt/equity ratio than large firms. Portfolio investors 
generally only have to be concerned with systematic risk, since specific risks can be 
diversified away. This does not apply to owners of small businesses, since they have a large 
part of their financial wealth as well as their human capital tied up in their own firms. These 
considerations mean that a long-run survival objective requires a lower debt/equity ratio than 
in firms with highly diversified ownership, where it is rational to choose a debt/equity ratio 
that maximizes the firm’s market value.  
 
There is substantial evidence supporting the idea that the individual’s wealth position has 
important effects upon the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and for the propensity to 
expand. For example, Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) find that the likelihood of starting a business 
in Sweden increases significantly among those who receive an inheritance or a lottery gain.17 
Taken in isolation this can perhaps be explained by increased risk propensity as a result of a 
windfall gain rather than as a result of added wealth (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but 
                                                 
16 Henrekson and Rosenberg (2000) provide a detailed comparion of the US and Swedish tax rules for stock 
options. 
17 Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) arrive at the same conclusion in an empirical analysis based on British data. 
Fölster (2001) develops and tests a model where high taxes and low savings create a “vicious circle for 
entrepreneurship”. 
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Lindh and Ohlsson (1998) find that a more unequal wealth distribution covaries positively 
with the share of self-employed. Hence, the combination of low private savings and an 
extremely even distribution of these low savings implies that few people either themselves or 
from their associates, friends or relatives are able to raise the requisite equity to realize their 
business projects. 
 
Thus, ceteris paribus, small and newly established firms are more dependent on equity 
financing than are large, well-established firms. A large infusion of equity from the owner(s) 
signals that the project has a high expected rate of return, which makes it easier for a bank to 
grant the required credit. 
 
The real rate of taxation on financial savings was extremely high in Sweden for individuals 
before the 1990/91 tax reform. On interest income it typically exceeded 100 percent during 
the 1970s and 80s. At the same time, institutionalized saving in the form of life insurance 
policies, where the funds are by definition withdrawn from the non-institutional venture 
capital market, was highly favored. Even today the rate of taxation on saving and wealth 
accumulation is high in Sweden. First, the high tax rate on wage income makes it difficult to 
save a substantial portion of income that can subsequently be used for equity financing. 
Second, total taxation of accumulated wealth is high: 30 percent on the nominal current 
return, a 30 percent nominal capital gains tax and a 1.5 percent wealth tax on real estate, 
interest-bearing instruments and prime stock listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the so-
called A-list).18 The wealth tax is levied on all assessed wealth exceeding SEK 900,000 for the 
household.19 
 
The weak incentives for private individual savings also resulted in low levels of saving for 
households compared to other industrialized countries – see Table VII. 
 
Table VII Household Net Savings as a Share of Disposable Income in Sweden, OECD and 
 OECD Europe, 1960–95 (%). 
 
 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–95 
Sweden 6.1 4.0 1.1 5.6 
OECD 9.7 12.1 11.2 9.8 
OECD Europe 12.0 13.6 11.6 10.9 
 
Source: OECD, Historical Statistics 1960–1980 and 1960–1995; OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 64, 1998. 
 
                                                 
18 On 80 percent of the market value. 
19 On a stock market investment yielding a real rate on return of 10 percent before tax, the real rate of return 
after tax is 5.3 percent for households at an inflation rate of 3 percent, a dividend ratio of 3 percent of the market 
value of the stock, a holding period of 5 years and full wealth tax. 
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As a result of the consistently low household savings rates in Sweden for several decades, 
individual financial wealth fell very low by international comparisons. Such comparisons can 
only be made for a limited number of countries. Pålsson (1998) reports (based on OECD, 
Financial Statistics) that financial wealth per capita in Germany, Canada, France and Italy 
was generally 3–4 times larger than in Sweden in the early 1990s. In the US and Japan it was 
approximately six times larger than in Sweden. 
 
 
7. Job Security Mandates 
 
The Swedish Employment Security Act (Lagen om anställningskydd or LAS) from 1974 
includes four types of regulations that have a significant effect on the functioning of the labor 
market. These are rules about the period of notice of dismissal, the requirement of objective 
grounds for dismissal, time limits on probationary employment, and rules about the order of 
dismissals. Of special interest for the issues in our context are the rules governing the order in 
which different employees are to be dismissed. 
 
But are strict employment security provisions more harmful for smaller, more entrepreneurial 
and faster-growing employers? The likely answer is yes, but with one exception: the 
prevalence of start-ups without the intention of employing anybody in addition to the owner is 
likely to be increased, ceteris paribus. It is easier for large firms to exploit the gains from 
efficiently matching heterogeneous workers to a variety of tasks and positions. The scope for 
task reassignment within the firm is likely to rise with firm size. Thus, any inefficiencies 
induced by LAS in the assignment of workers to tasks are likely to be more severe and more 
costly for smaller firms. Furthermore, and for obvious reasons, one bad recruitment is 
proportionately more costly to a small firm.  
 
What the new research, sometimes called “the new view of the labor market“,20 suggests is 
that, in order to understand in what ways labor market regulations impede growth and 
employment, one has to analyze the effects on the individual firm. Several results from this 
research are essential in this respect: 
 
• A large number of jobs are continuously created through start-ups and expansions; 
likewise a large number of jobs are destroyed through closures and contraction of existing 
firms and establishments; in order to create one new job net on the order of 7–10 jobs 
have to be created gross.  
                                                 
20 See Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), Reynolds, (1999) and Davidsson, Lindmark and Olofsson (1996) 
for Sweden. 
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• The lion’s share of the gross flows emanate from changes in specific establishments and 
firms, and they have fairly little to do with employment shifts between industries or with 
aggregate net employment change. 
• Gross flows tend to be larger in newer, smaller, highly specialized and low wage firms, 
and in firms with high productivity growth. 
 
This new research suggests that for many firms – and in particular for firms with good growth 
prospects in terms of productivity and employment – there is a great need for flexibility both 
to increase the number of employees in response to rising demand and likewise to be able to 
contract rapidly when demand falls short of expectations. The road from small to large for a 
gazelle is far from straight, since the activities of new firms in particular are subject to 
genuine uncertainty. If, under such circumstances, rules are imposed that reduce the firms’ 
leeway for rapid adjustment one should expect both lower willingness to expand in general 
and that fewer firms, despite a good product or a viable idea, will grow from small to large in 
a short period of time. 
 
In addition, a strictly applied “last in – first out“ principle in case of redundancies implies that 
tenure at the present place of employment becomes relatively more important for labor 
security than individual skill and productivity. This fact increases the individual’s opportunity 
cost of changing employers or of leaving a secure salaried job to become an entrepreneur. 
Labor market inflexibility is inherently inconsistent with the flexibility, nonhierarchical 
structures, networking and labor mobility across firms that distinguish typical entrepreneurial 
business cultures, notably the one in Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994). 
 
OECD (1994) has attempted to compare the severerity of government regulations on labor 
standards in the early 1990s. Of the 18 countries included in the survey, only Greece exhibited 
a higher degree of regulation than Sweden. This is spite of the fact that the study does not take 
into account the increase in de facto level of regulation that can result from collective 
agreements, which in Sweden often stipulate high minimum wages and extend employment 
protection well beyond what is legislated (Storrie, 1994). 
 
More specifically, Sweden is the only country where the order of dismissal is laid down in 
law (Kazamaki Ottersten, 1994), and according to a survey by Industriförbundet (1995, p. 87) 
Sweden had the shortest maximum period of probationary employment in all of Europe in the 
early 1990s. In many cases, the union agreement may even further limit the length of the trial 
period, and in many sectors, trade unions have the right to veto probationary employment and 
temporary employment (Storey, 1994). Furthermore, in most other countries than Sweden 
unfair dismissal regulations are not extended to small firms (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1993). Funck (1998, p. 5), in a comparison of the job security legislation in the 
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Nordic countries even concluded that ”When several employees are dismissed because of 
redundancy, the employers in Denmark, Finland and Norway can in practice freely choose 
which employees that are going to be laid off.” 
 
8. Wage-setting Institutions 
 
There are a priori reasons to believe that the fashion in which the price of labor is determined 
is not identically well suited to all industries and firms of different types. Swedish labor 
organizations successfully pursued egalitarian wage policies from the mid 1960s until the 
breakdown of centralized wage bargaining in 1983 (Hibbs, 1990; Edin and Holmlund, 1995). 
The strength of Swedish labor organizations and the centralized nature of the wage-setting 
institutions appear to have facilitated a remarkable compression of the wage structure during 
this period, judging by cross-country comparisons of wage inequality trends (Davis, 1992). 
To the extent that Swedish wage-setting developments drove up wages in the lower tiers of 
the distribution relative to outcomes under other institutional arrangements, they reinforced 
the concentration of economic activity in larger, older and more capital-intensive firms and 
sectors. This inference follows from the ample evidence that wages rise with the age, capital 
intensity and – especially – the size of employers (e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1989; Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1991, 1996). In sharp contrast to the evidence for the United States, Albæk et al. 
(1995) find that the employer size-wage effect is negligible in Sweden, which gives credence 
to the view that egalitarian wage policies have raised the relative labor costs of smaller 
businesses.  
 
Institutions that truncate or compress the lower tail of the wage distribution disadvantage 
smaller businesses – and hence discourage the transition from salaried employment to self-
employment – for at least two important reasons. First, many smaller employers operate with 
less-skilled workers. It follows that mandating wage uniformity across workers imposes 
higher effective costs per unit of labor services on such employers. In this regard, the careful 
study by Brown and Medoff (1989) concludes that half or more of the large size-wage 
premiums observed in US data reflect a systematic sorting of more skilled workers to larger 
employers. Second, larger employers tend to operate with more capital-intensive technologies. 
It follows that a given wage premium generates a smaller percentage increase in average costs 
for large than for small employers.  
 
Blanchflower and Freeman (1992) and Blau and Kahn (1996) provide evidence that unions 
and other centralized wage-setting institutions compress wages among observationally similar 
workers by promoting standard rate compensation policies. Thus, centralized wage-setting 
institutions may disadvantage smaller businesses and businesses aiming at promoting an 
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entrepreneurial culture within the firm by implementing standard rate compensation policies 
that closely tie wages to easily observed job and worker characteristics such as occupation, 
education, experience and seniority. This follows from evidence that larger employers evince 
a greater preference for standard rate compensation policies.  
 
Davis and Henrekson (2000) present comprehensive evidence that industries with high or low 
average wages and industries with a high wage dispersion and a larger idiosyncratic element 
in the wage-setting (the part of the wage that cannot be explained by easily observable 
characteristics) grew slowly in Sweden relative to the US during the period when wage-
setting was highly centralized and wage dispersion was drastically reduced (1965–85). This 
pattern was reversed when centralization was reduced from the mid 1980s. 
 
 
9. The Current Upturn in Light of the Analysis 
 
At the time of finalizing this manuscript (April 2000) there is a highly visible upturn in 
entrepreneurial activity in Sweden both in absolute terms and relative to other countries. The 
GDP growth rate was 3.0 and 3.8 percent p.a. in 1998 and 1999, respectively, and aggregate 
employment grew at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent during 1998–99.21 The growth rate 
is expected to increase even further in 2000 and to remain in excess of 3 percent in 2001. 
Open unemployment is also expected to fall rapidly and reach a level of 4.0 percent by the 
end of 2001. According to a narrow definition there were 58 IPOs in Sweden during 1999, 
and the majority of them were IT related.22 According to a broader criterion applied by 
Nyhetsbyrån Ticker (www.ticker.se), the number of IPOs was as high as 98 in 1998 and 105 
in 1999 compared to 29 in 1996. New entrepreneurial firms, in particular in the IT sector, are 
still being formed at a rapid rate, and there are also a number of examples of successful spin-
offs from Ericsson.  
 
Should this favorable development be seen as a rejection of the thesis in this paper? We do 
not think so. First, the development is still of recent vintage, and hence it is too early to tell to 
what extent we are dealing with a cyclical phenomenon. Second, and much more important, a 
number of measures were taken during the 1990s that can be expected to encourage the 
emergence of a stronger entrepreneurial culture: 
                                                 
21 Statistics Sweden, National Accounts and Labour Force Surveys. 
22 This includes all new listings in 1999 on the OM Stockholm Stock Exchange, Nya Marknaden, Aktietorget, 
Innovationsmarknaden and the SBI lists. 
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• In the mid 1980s a gradual deregulation of the capital market began and the deregulation 
is now complete. In combination with a new stringent central government process and an 
independent central bank there has been a dramatic increase in financial stability and a 
precipitous drop in interest rates. 
• The corporate tax rate was cut in half and is now 28 percent, which strongly favors equity 
relative to debt financing. The introduction of a uniform 30 percent flat capital income tax 
rate and the abolition of wealth taxation on unlisted shares has greatly favored individual 
equity investments relative to the 1980s. 
• The highest marginal tax rate has been lowered from close to 90 percent around 1980 to 
roughly 56 percent, which has increased the after-tax rate of return on human capital 
investment and increased the scope for entrepreneurial development in the household-
related service sector. 
• The wage bargaining system is now less centralized than before and, in particular wages 
in the upper decile have increased rapidly in the latter half of the 1990s (Davis and 
Henrekson, 2000). 
• Certain deregulatory measures on the labor market have already been taken, which in 
practice offers more flexibility than before.23 
• The deregulation of several previously regulated markets, in particular the deregulation of 
the market for telecommunications (1993), opened new arenas for entrepreneurial 
expansion. 
• Since 1991 a number of measures have been taken that facilitate the transfer of publicly 
financed services to private production. There has been a marked rise in the share of 
public consumption that is privately produced (Ministry of Finance, 1999).  
 
Other factors are more fortuitous, but still in line with our thesis. The Stockholm stock 
exchange had the most rapid rise of all stock exchanges in the industrialized world during the 
1980s and 90s (Economist, 1999) and given that 60 percent of the population owns listed 
shares, this has made a large number of people wealthy. According to the analysis in section 
7.3, this should spur entrepreneurial activity. For the first time since the interwar period, the 
deregulation of the credit market in the 1980s also paved the way for the formation of new 
family fortunes, and in many cases part of that wealth appears to have been used as angel 
capital in today’s new IT firms. Finally, fortunate timing is involved. The spectacular 
development in the Swedish IT sector would not have been possible without the existence of 
Ericsson and its success in wireless communications, which turned out to be perhaps the 
number one growth industry in the world in the latter half of the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
23 In 1997 a new type of employment contract was allowed, so-called prearranged temporary employment 
(överenskommen visstidsanställning), which gives every firm an unconditional right to employ up to five persons 
for a maximum of one year. Another 1997 change was procedural. Local collective agreements that replace the 
regulations in the law are now permitted. This makes it possible, through local agreements, to annul a tenure-
based order of priority in cases of dismissal and to annul the right to reemployment for dismissed workers, and to 
extend the duration of temporary employment beyond 12 months. In 2000 firms with no more than 10 employees 
were given the right to exempt two employees from the “last-in – first-out” principle in case of redundancies. 
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Thus, the current boom suggests that changes in the conditions facilitating the emergence of a 
strong entrepreneurial culture may well—with  some lag—lead to the expected result, 
although there are particular ancillary circumstances that have reinforced this pattern in 
Sweden today. On the other hand, compared to the US the rules of the game are still 
unfavorable: the taxation of entrepreneurial income (including stock options and the high 
overall taxation of VC firms) continues to be high, the steep rate of labor taxation reduces the 
rate of return on human capital investment and the scope for entrepreneurial expansion of 
household-related services, and the labor market remains highly regulated.  
 
In 1999 the Swedish GDP growth rate exceeded the OECD average by 1.1 percentage 
points.24 However, it should be kept in mind that the recent upturn needs to be sustained for a 
long time in order for Sweden to regain a substantial share of lost ground in terms of per 
capita income relative to the OECD average. But if our analysis is correct, it is also likely that 
further measures encouraging entrepreneurial activity will make it possible for Sweden to 
shift to a long-run growth path that can bring the country back to its previous high position in 
terms of GDP per capita and aggregate employment. 
 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this study has been to test the hypothesis that institutional arrangements 
influence on entrepreneurial activity as manifested in the prevalence of firm start-ups and high 
growth firms. Our method is exploratory and we largely draw on empirical evidence from 
Sweden including an analysis of the pertinent institutions and policies.  
 
Providing indisputable evidence for the relationships we investigate is a difficult and perhaps 
an impossible task. However, we still maintain that the consistency of our findings make a 
strong case for the interpretation that the institutional arrangements we have discussed are 
important determinants of entrepreneurial activity. Our analysis shows that the small number 
of nascent entrepreneurs and the limited employment contribution by high growth firms is 
consistent with our characterization of the institutional environment. The recent upturn of 
entrepreneurship in Sweden is also consistent with a number of policy measures that can be 
expected to improve the entrepreneurial climate. 
 
                                                 
24 National Institute of Economic Research, Konjunkturläget, March 2000. 
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If the analysis in this paper is correct, a number of policy conclusions follow. First and 
foremost, it is important both to extend the economic arenas in which competent 
entrepreneurs can thrive, and to improve the institutions and rules of the game determining the 
incentive structure for entrepreneurs. This pertains both to the decision to become an 
entrepreneur and the subsequent behavior of entrepreneurs, so that viable business ideas give 
rise to high-growth firms. 
 
From this it follows that the government has a crucial role to play. But this does not imply 
that the government should give support to individual entrepreneurs, since they do not have 
the competence to pick winners (Saxenian, 1994). Apart from a broad opening up of the 
service sector to entrepreneurial development a number of institutional reforms in Sweden 
are, according to our analysis, likely to contribute to a strengthened entrepreneurial culture. 
First, if taxation of entrepreneurial income is made no more severe than taxation of interest 
income and business income of portfolio investors, this will strengthen the incentive for 
entrepreneurship or expansion of operations when this is socially profitable. Likewise, a high 
rate of labor taxation is, in many instances, likely to be an impediment to entrepreneurial 
activity, especially in the household-related service sector. Second, better incentives for 
private wealth accumulation in general will increase the supply of venture capital. 
 
Third, the labor security legislation makes tenure with the present employer an asset that 
reduces employee mobility. A major explanation of the success of places like Silicon Valley 
is that employees migrate among firms so frequently, thus spreading knowledge across firms 
at a rapid rate.  
 
Fourth, a true entrepreneurial culture also requires entrepreneurship to be fostered within the 
firm (intrapreneurship). This is likely to demand a great deal of flexibility in the choice of 
remunerative schemes, including ”high-powered incentives” (Stevenson, 1985; Williamson, 
1985) such as stock-option plans and wage components that are not fixed. The Swedish wage-
setting system, with many centralized elements remaining, is characterized by a great deal of 
relative wage rigidity within firms, across firms and across industries.  
 
Policy-making involves the creation of institutions that balances many interests. The Swedish 
case illustrates the effects on aggregate economic development when incentives for economic 
renewal are given too little weight in that process. If our analysis is correct, further institutional 
change encouraging entrepreneurship and firm growth would make it possible for Sweden to 
shift to a long-run growth path that can bring the country back to its previous top position in 
terms of GDP per capita. 
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Appendix 
In order to analyze the choice between market and household production of a service, let us 
introduce the following notation:  
 
w = the buyer’s hourly wage before tax in her own profession 
w* = the service producer’s hourly wage before tax 
c1 = the production cost in the do-it-yourself case 
c2 = the cost of buying the service in the market 
H = required labor time for the professional service producer 
t = marginal tax rate of the buyer including employee contributions to social security 
s = mandatory social security contributions (for the employer) 
m = VAT rate 
 
In order to simplify the exposition, we assume that the required time for service production in 
the do-it-yourself case is one hour, thus 1/H can be interpreted as a measure of the relative 
productivity of the professional producer. Furthermore, we assume that all cost is labor cost 
and that the service in question will always be produced either by the consumer herself or by a 
professional. The production cost in the do-it-yourself case equals the after tax wage:  
 
c1 = w(1− t)  
 
The cost of buying the service in the market is given by: 
 
c2 = w * (1 + s)((1 + m )H  
 
The service will be bought in the market as long as c1 > c2, i.e., if 
w
w *
1
H
> (1 + s)(1 + m )
(1 − t) . 
 
This expression is used in section 4.1 above. 
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Table A Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Different Combinations of Owners and 
 Sources of Finance, 1960, 1980, 1991, 1994 and 1995 (real pre-tax rate of 
 return 10% at actual inflation rates). 
 
 Debt New share 
issues
Retained 
earnings 
1960  
Households 27.2 92.7 48.2 
Tax exempt institutions –32.2 31.4 31.2 
Insurance companies –21.7 41.6 34.0 
  
1980  
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9 
Tax exempt institutions –83.4 –11.6 11.2 
Insurance companies –54.9 38.4 28.7 
  
1991  
Households 31.7 61.8 54.2 
Tax exempt institutions –9.4 4.0 18.7 
Insurance companies 14.4 33.3 31.6 
  
1994  
Households 32.0/27.0† 28.3/18.3† 36.5/26.5† 
Tax exempt institutions –14.9 21.8 21.8 
Insurance companies 0.7 32.3 33.8 
  
1995  
Households 32.0/27.0† 67.7/57.7† 48.0/38.0† 
Tax exempt institutions –3.5 25.7 25.7 
Insurance companies 21.0 53.3 50.4 
†Excluding wealth tax. The wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. 
Note: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation rates 
were used: 1960: 3%, 1970: 7%, 1980: 9.4%, 1985: 5%, 1991: 5%, 1994: 3%, 1995: 3%. The calculations 
conform to the general framework developed King and Fullerton (1984). The average holding period is assumed 
to be 10 years. 
Source: Calculations provided by Jan Södersten, see Södersten (1984, 1993). 
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